Robert Pippin’s much anticipated *Hegel’s Realm of Shadows* is at once the culmination of decades of discipline defining work on Hegel’s philosophy, and a masterful, stand-alone interpretation of Hegel’s most difficult text, the *Science of Logic*. The central motif of Pippin’s interpretation is the relation between logic and metaphysics in the aftermath of Kant’s critical project, and more specifically, how Hegel understood logic as metaphysics in his transformation and appropriation of that project. The logic as metaphysics theme of Pippin’s book is no doubt an attempt to push back against the chorus of criticisms over the years concerning the so-called non-metaphysical reading of Hegel, of which Pippin has long been viewed as a major proponent. The debate between the metaphysical and non-metaphysical Hegel was always saddled by disagreement about the term “metaphysics” itself, which arguably made the very distinction much less helpful than initially appeared. In framing his reading of the *Logic* through the question of how issues of logic and issues of metaphysics coincide, Pippin refreshingly overturns the ill-defined terms of that old debate, which opens up new interpretive possibilities for consideration.

Although his reading of the *Logic* is framed through this new interpretive lens, there are nonetheless some important continuities between *Hegel’s Realm of Shadows* and Pippin’s previous work (most notably, *Hegel’s Idealism* from 1989 and *Hegel’s Practical Philosophy* from 2008) such that a recognizably Pippinian position is readily discernable in the new book. The most significant continuity is undoubtedly the apperception theme, in which the self-conscious and reflexive character of judgment is the most important common principle of Kantian and Hegelian idealisms, one that is more consistently and thoroughly developed in Hegel than in Kant, and one that provides the key for understanding Hegel’s concept of the Concept (*der Begriff*) as the absolute *a priori* principle of intelligibility.¹ In connection with the apperception theme, Pippin continues to defend two positions familiar from his previous work. The first is that Hegel’s rejection of Kant’s intuition theory results in the claim that concepts and intuitions are *distinguishable* but *inseparable*, such that what is immediately given to be thought is always already a “mediated immediacy” (75). The second is that insofar as immediacy is mediated and negated in the apperceptive act of judgment, apperception itself is deeply connected to issues of freedom, self-determination, and autonomy, so much so that Pippin understands Hegel’s to be an “emancipatory logic” (18).

The logic as metaphysics theme also opens up some new directions for Pippin’s interpretation, the most notable of which is the continual rise in importance of Aristotle’s

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¹ I capitalize “Concept” when discussing Hegel’s technical use of the term in order to distinguish it from ordinary uses of the term which also appear frequently throughout this essay.
theory of substantial form for his understanding of Hegel’s concept of the Concept. Of course, Aristotelian ideas are never absent from any interpretation of Hegel, but in Pippin’s earlier work these proved subordinate to Kantian ones, and their discussion was always deeply colored by a Kantian lens. In the new book, the task (put crudely for the moment) is to find the right balance between Aristotle and Kant in Hegel’s philosophy, a task that leads to two new directions in particular. First, alongside the apperception theme, Pippin now argues that der Begriff understood as the principle of all intelligibility is nothing other than something’s substantial form, that “[e]ntities are the determinate entities that they are ‘in terms of’ or ‘because of’ their concept or substantial form” (200). This new position noteworthy because it is not immediately obvious why the Kantian and Aristotelian interpretations of the Concept are not in tension with one another: if things, simply in virtue of being the kinds of things that they are, have a substantial form that constitutes their determinacy and intelligibility, then the substantial form of things would be independent of any acts of apperceptive judging, and intelligibility would be a feature of the form of objects rather than a result of self-conscious acts of judging. In the literature, Robert Stern has clearly articulated the contrast between the Kantian and Aristotelian views as it pertains to understanding Hegel’s metaphysics:

according to Hegel’s absolute idealism, the unity of the object is derived from the embodiment of a universal substance-form, and is not grounded in the unity of the subject. . . . objects are structured by concepts; but (in contrast to Kant) both the concepts and the objects exist independently of the activity of the subject . . . [and] is not tied in with the synthesizing activity of any subject.2

Although Pippin would likely object here that on his understanding of Kant, apperceptive spontaneity should decidedly not be understood as “a subjective mental activity,” the question of how we can understand the principle of intelligibility both as apperceptive judging and as the substantial form of things remains (35). Undoubtedly, Pippin intends the logic as metaphysics theme as supplying a possible path towards addressing this question.

Following directly from the rise in importance of Aristotle’s theory of substantial form, the second new direction of Pippin’s reading is the increased prominence of a number of themes surrounding purposiveness, teleology, and life, which all stem from the question of Hegel’s inheritance of Kant’s Critique of Judgment. In the new book, Pippin spends the two penultimate chapters reflecting on the significance of two dimensions of the issue of life in connection with Hegel’s Concept: first, that concepts themselves are taken by Hegel to be “alive” in some sense, and that the relation between the thought-determinations treated in the Logic as a whole should be understood in organic terms; second, that life itself is treated by Hegel as a logical concept, one that belongs necessarily to a science of logic. These two issues orient Pippin’s reading of the Doctrine of the Concept, and although they provide further clues as to how the Kantian and Aristotelian interpretations of the Concept might cohere, my contention will be that there is a missed opportunity in his engagement with these themes that leaves open a number of questions concerning how apperception and substantial form—and

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2 Stern 1990, 111–112.
thereby logic and metaphysics—fit together in Hegel’s logic project. Although Pippin is correct to emphasize the importance of apperceptive judgment as per his earlier reading, his understanding of judgment continues to be primarily and, arguably, narrowly focused on Kant’s first Critique account, whereas Hegel’s account of judgment can only be fully grasped in light of the influence of key insights from Kant’s third Critique. Indeed, the third Critique can be taken as Kant’s own attempt to consider the relation between apperceptive judgment and nature’s substantial forms given the incompleteness of the first Critique account, a consideration that I argue is the key for understanding the Logic as a whole, and the Doctrine of the Concept in particular.

1. Returning to the Apperception Theme: Inside Judgment

One of the biggest questions facing anyone reading the Science of Logic is the by no means simple one of what exactly this book is meant to be about, since how we evaluate the successes and failures of Hegel’s arguments depends entirely on how we answer this question. Pippin offers a refreshingly straightforward and indeed highly plausible answer, suggesting that the Logic’s central aim is to account for the possibility of intelligibility as such, presenting a systematic account of what must be required a priori if being is to be rendered intelligible by thought. We can note three features of Pippin’s understanding of Hegel’s project of exploring the possibility of intelligibility. The first is the purely a priori character of a science of logic or a science of “pure thinking,” which means that an investigation into the possibility of intelligibility as such yields knowledge that is independent of empirical experience (4–5). Although there is a sense in which the a priori character of Hegel’s investigation is non-controversial (its topic is, after all, logic, and Hegel himself affirms that there is continuity between Kant’s transcendental logic and his own), it is important to note that Hegel does not adopt Kant’s usage of the a priori/a posteriori distinction in his work, which immediately raises some questions concerning how the a priori is to be understood in the context of the Logic.3 That the contents of the Logic are independent of all sense experience is beyond doubt, but Hegel’s approach to actuality and actualization also challenges the demarcation as understood by Kant, for what is presupposed as “a priori” only gains its significance in the process of its actualization. I mention this at the outset because it matters for understanding Hegel’s metaphor and Pippin’s title of logic as the “realm of shadows”: although logic as a priori is independent of sense experience, it is not, for Hegel, a self-sufficient realm that has reality independent of that which casts its shadow. Like all shadows, logic is tied to the actuality of which it is the shadow.4 Pippin’s insistence throughout on the a priority of logic thus raises a question rather than providing an answer to a problem: what casts the shadow of logic that is the topic of Hegel’s investigation?

Second, the question of the possibility of the intelligibility of being leads Pippin quickly to the familiar dictum that “[t]o be is to be intelligible: the founding principle of Greek

3 Pippin also notes Hegel’s general avoidance of this Kantian terminology, but cites Hegel’s praise of Kant’s synthetic a priori judgments as evidence that pure thinking can be easily associated with the a priori (5n4).
4 See Pippin’s discussion of Hegel’s metaphor (28–29).
metaphysics and philosophy itself” (77). Being for Hegel is determinate, intelligible being and Pippin rightly notes that to entertain the idea of an unintelligible being is not to think “of something strange and limiting,” but is simply “not thinking at all.” To determine what being is is to determine at the same time what it is to render being intelligible; or again, “[u]nderstanding what it is to render something intelligible is just thereby to understand the intelligibles, what there is to be thought—being” (14). The identity of being and thought is undoubtedly a central theme of the Logic, and a well-known implication of Hegel’s treatment of this identity is his rejection of Kant’s positing of a realm of unknowable things-in-themselves, a domain of being that is in principle unintelligible and unthinkable for finite knowers. In his reading of the Logic, Pippin repeatedly rejects all accounts of the possibility of intelligibility that would make the identity of thought and being merely the result of some species-specific capacities, such as the ones that human beings simply happen to possess. Any restriction on the possibility of intelligibility indexed merely to our “finite” or “subjective” capacities—the forms of “our” intuition or the discursive character of “our” understanding—would undermine claims to genuine knowing altogether. The identity of being and thought thus functions as a necessary feature of giving an account of intelligibility as such, with restrictions on that identity amounting to psychologism or a merely subjective idealism.

Third and finally, Pippin argues that “the basic unit of intelligibility in Hegel’s account is the judgment” (14). Following from the apperception theme of his earlier work, judgment is an act of apperceptive spontaneity, but importantly, this self-conscious act should not be understood in subjective, psychological, or phenomenological terms, but is a strictly logical, a priori principle of intelligibility. Although it is clear what Pippin wants to avoid in emphasizing the logical character of his interest in apperception—namely, psychologism and subjective idealism—he is not thereby denying that “any reference to thinking presumes a thinker, indeed a living, purposive, rational thinker” (7). This raises the question of how we are to understand the connection, if any, between apperceptive judgment as a purely logical principle, and the self-conscious acts of individual living thinkers in whom this logical principle is necessarily actualized. Hegel himself raised a similar challenge to Fichte in the Differenzschrift, claiming that Fichte had in fact failed in his goal of reconciling the absolute and the empirical I, leading to his ill-fated doctrine (in Hegel’s estimation) of infinite striving. Moving beyond the apperception theme and now developing the logic as metaphysics theme, Pippin further contends that things themselves have a judgmental form. He writes: “A thing, in its determinate intelligibility has a judgmental structure” (51). And in Hegel’s words:

\[\text{every thing is a judgment [alle Dinge sind ein Urteil]. — That is, every thing is a singular [Einzelle] which is inwardly a universality [Allgemeinheit] or inner nature, in other words, a universal that is made singular; universality and singularity distinguish themselves within it, but at the same time they are identical. (EL §167)\]5

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5 Pippin quotes this passage at 50–51; see also his helpful discursive footnote regarding the unusual grammar of Hegel’s formulation at 50n28.
That things, objects, and being itself are judgment shaped in virtue of being universal and singular (or individual) at once captures what I take to be at the heart of Hegel’s claim that “logic coincides with metaphysics, with the science of things grasped in thoughts that used to be taken to express the essentialities of the things” (EL §24). The proposal then, is that the shape, structure, or form of judgment is at once the form of thought and thus the subject matter of logic, and the essential, substantial form of things and thus the subject matter of metaphysics. The a priori identity of being and thought thus comes together in the form of judgment as the basic principle and unit of intelligibility as such, where judgment is at once a logical act of apperceptive spontaneity, and the metaphysical structure and form of things.

In my view, Pippin’s employment of judgment as the hinge of both logic and metaphysics is indeed the best and most productive approach to interpreting the Science of Logic, and it is one with which I largely concur. Expanding on the McDowellian thesis of absolute idealism as the “unboundedness of the conceptual,” Pippin’s strategy is to explore both logic and metaphysics as all “‘inside’ judgment’s self-determination,” such that there is no “outside” of judgment when it pertains to the intelligibility of being (9). In the next section, I consider Pippin’s approach to judgment in more detail in order to address the following question: What is the conception of judgment at work such that it is both a self-conscious logical act and the substantial form of things? And more importantly, how are these two ways of understanding judgment related? Although I am in agreement with Pippin’s “inside judgment” strategy, my argument will be that Pippin’s account of judgment as apperceptive spontaneity is ultimately not sufficient for providing a successful account of the coincidence of logic and metaphysics. In order for Pippin to successfully defend his understanding of this coincidence where judgment is not only a self-conscious logical act but also the shape and structure of the world, an expanded conception of judgment is required, one that I argue is best formulated via the third Critique, rather than Kant’s Metaphysical and Transcendental Deductions, as a point of departure. As I noted in the introduction, Pippin indeed heads in this direction by engaging extensively with a number of third Critique themes, but ultimately, his continued insistence on the first Critique account of apperception as primary cannot (any longer) accommodate his own evolving thesis.

2. Aristotle and Kant on Judgment, and back to Kant again

In order to employ judgment as the key to the coincidence of logic and metaphysics, Pippin argues that the “S-is-P form already embodies a metaphysics” (87). On the Aristotelian side, the claim is that being must be something determinate, and the determinations of being are simply “the general predicates without which any specific determination would not be possible” (60). The thought-determinations (Denkbestimmungen) of the Logic are the systematic presentation and development of these general predicates or concepts (quality, quantity, essence, appearance, etc.) that enable being to be rendered intelligible as specific determinations, and each book of the Logic discusses a different predicative form: in the Doctrine of Being, S is P; in the Doctrine of Essence, S is essentially P; and in the Doctrine of the Concept, S is a good P (254). Whereas the predicates treated in the Doctrine of Being make the case for the necessary
determinativeness of intelligible being and against a logical version of the myth of the given, the predicates treated in the Doctrine of Essence demonstrate that the determinate specification of being requires essential rather than merely accidental predication, that rendering being intelligible requires understanding the distinction between essential and inessential predicates. Once something is rendered intelligible in terms of its essential, substantial form (what Hegel calls actuality [Wirklichkeit] or the being-at-work of the thing), the Doctrine of the Concept presents forms of predication that allow us to determine the goodness or badness of some determinate, specified being in accordance with its substantial form, or now, in accordance with its Concept. Completing his Aristotelian understanding of the determinations of being as the general predicates of any possible intelligibility, Hegel also argues that the predicate he refers to as the Concept importantly functions in a different way from other predicates. He writes:

[T]he nature, the specific essence, that which is truly permanent and substantial in the manifold and contingency of appearance and fleeting externalization, is the Concept of the thing [der Begriff der Sache], the immanent universal [das in ihr selbst Allgemeine], and that each human individual though infinitely unique is so primarily because he is a human, and each individual animal is such an individual primarily because it is an animal; if this is true then there is no saying what such an individual should still be [was so ein Individuum noch sein sollte] if this foundation were removed, no matter how many other predicates with which the individual would still be otherwise adorned — if, that is, such a foundation can equally be called a predicate like the rest. (WL 16–17/5:26)

Concepts are predicates of possible judgments, but the Concept on Hegel’s understanding stands apart from other predicates in a number of ways. First, something’s Concept is its nature, essence, or substantial form: the Concept is an immanent universal, a species-concept, or kind that allows individuals (or singulars) to be determined as the determinate individuals that they are. In Hegel’s examples, both in the passage above and throughout the Subjective Logic, the model for the Concept is undeniably the unity and form of organic genera and species, without thereby implying that all things in fact belong to organic kinds. Second, Hegel claims that the Concept is the universal identical with the thing or Sache itself, which suggests that the Concept is manifest or actualized in the individual thing, and is not an abstract or formal universal entirely separable from concrete individuals. Finally, unlike other predicates, the Concept is the “foundation” without which individuals could not be determined or specified as individuals at all, no matter how many other predicates we may attach to them as constitutive of their determinativeness. The Concept is what allows us to determine what individuals should, ought, or are supposed to be, and thus carries a normative power in determining an individual thing. Strictly speaking then, and keeping in mind that Hegel is more

6 See for example WL 533/6:278–279.
7 This formulation also recalls Kant’s understanding of teleological judgment in the third Critique: “A teleological judgment compares the concept of a product of nature as it is with one of what it ought to be [was es sein sollte]. Here the judging of its possibility is grounded in a concept (of the end) that precedes it a priori” (EE 20:240).
interested in the spirit rather than the letter of Aristotle’s texts, the Concept combines Aristotle’s thinking on primary and secondary substances, rather than operating as “a predicate like the rest.”

The Aristotelian approach to the coincidence of logic and metaphysics is coupled with a Kantian one, and here Pippin argues that what Kant calls general logic must have an “immediate bearing” on, and in many ways is always already, a transcendental logic (64).\(^8\) The key is Kant’s Metaphysical Deduction, and what interests Hegel are claims such as the following: the subject-predicate form has bearing on, and requires, a distinction between substance and properties; antecedent-consequence relations have bearing on, and require, the thought of necessary connections between events and a distinction between causes and effects. General, formal logic (a table of judgments) already implies a metaphysics (a table of categories), for it bears on and reveals what is required for the intelligibility of any possible object. Once the connection between general and transcendental logic is in place, we can add to this the central insight of the Transcendental Deduction, namely, that the basic possibility of intelligibility “depends on an act, an act of rendering intelligible or judging” (71–72). To consider intelligibility in terms of such acts is to consider “the only beings for whom beings can be intelligible, [namely,] rational beings” (57). The acts of judging of rational beings are fundamentally self-conscious or apperceptive, reflexive and self-referential, such that “judgment is the consciousness of judgment” (110).\(^9\) Following through this Kantian/Fichteian line of argument, Pippin returns to the apperception theme and claims that what Hegel calls the Concept is “thought’s self-consciousness of itself in thinking,” adding that this self-consciousness is fundamentally what divides rational beings from non-rational animals (106).

Pippin’s attempt to combine Aristotle and Kant into one comprehensive account of judgment raises three related puzzles, all of which point in the direction of third Critique themes. The first is one I raised in the introduction concerning the compatibility of the Kantian and Aristotelian accounts. If intelligibility essentially rests on immanent species-concepts actualized in things themselves as a “foundation,” this would appear to be independent of any acts of apperceptive judgment.\(^10\) In his more Kantian leaning account, Pippin tries to find a balance between the claim of the Transcendental Deduction that intelligibility is possible only in connection with the self-conscious acts of rendering intelligible carried out by rational beings, and the interpretive claim that idealism is not an impositionist view in which minds simply impose their form upon things, which indeed have their own substantial form in accordance with their Concept.\(^11\) The question then becomes how it is that apperceptive judgment has the

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\(^8\) See also 76.

\(^9\) Pippin is quoting from Rödl 2007.

\(^10\) Pippin himself raises a version of this question late in the book. Referring to the activity of the Concept, he asks: “what is such self-determining such that it is at the same time an aspect of being in its intelligibility and the activity of thinking?” (257) At 266, and esp. 266n12, he also notes that there is indeed a fundamental difference between Aristotle and Kant, framing it in terms of the problem of “the emergence of subjectivity.”

\(^11\) Hegel is likewise trying to balance these two claims. That intelligibility should be thought in connection with acts of rendering intelligible is expressed in Hegel’s often quoted claim that truth must be expressed as both substance and subject (I would add here that Hegel’s understanding of subjectivity is a lot more capacious than Kant’s
power to judge in accordance with the substantial form of things (species-concepts and kinds), given that this substantial form is actualized in things independent of acts of apperceptive judgment. In the third Critique, Kant poses this as the problem of cognitive fit: how can we assume that the power of judgment is fit for finding unity amidst the infinite diversity of nature, given that the unity of form in question takes us far beyond judgment’s powers as given in the table of categories? Kant’s answer, of utmost importance for understanding Hegel’s Logic, is that the power of judgment requires a principle of the purposiveness of nature, which assumes “that nature in its boundless multiplicity has hit upon a division of itself into genera and species that makes it possible for our power of judgment to find consensus in the comparison of natural forms. . . . in accordance with the form of a logical system” (EE 20:213, 20: 216).

Related to the problem of cognitive fit, a second puzzle arises for Pippin’s insistence on apperceptive judgment as a principle of intelligibility: without undercutting the import of the insights of the Transcendental Deduction, Kant himself arrives at the conclusion that the work of the Deduction is not sufficient for fully resolving the problem of determinacy or intelligibility, but requires the insights of the third Critique. Although this is an extremely complicated issue, Kant claims that the a priori validity of the categories, while utterly necessary for any possible experience, nonetheless underdetermine experience to a sufficiently high degree that they themselves cannot guarantee that judgment will be able to acquire the more determinate concepts required for the intelligibility of determinate particulars. For example, although the categories provide us with the ability to determine some determinate thing as an enduring substance with properties located at a particular time and place, what is not guaranteed is that judgment thereby has the power to further determine that same determinate thing as a tree, or further still, that the tree before us is a spruce as opposed to a linden. Put into Hegelian terms, what apperceptive judgment armed with a table of categories is not empowered to do, is to determine the Concept or substantial form of things.12 To be clear, the issue is not simply that concepts like “tree,” “spruce,” or “linden” are empirical concepts, and hence, simply have no role in a science of logic, making the problem a non-starter; rather, the issue is that apperceptive spontaneity as conceived in the Deduction is not sufficiently empowered to determine the unity of form exemplified in such species-concepts or immanent universals (or secondary substances).13 For judgment to have the power to ascend to, reflect upon, and conceive of that unity of form characteristic of the Concept, the power of judgment has to be extended beyond the Deduction account, with the principle of purposiveness again being the key to the extension of judgment’s powers.

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12 Indeed, this is why Hegel claims that only his Objective Logic can be compared with Kant’s Transcendental Logic, implying that the Doctrine of the Concept or Subjective Logic supplies something that extends beyond it. My claim is that the third Critique is far more important for understanding the developments of the Subjective Logic than the first.

13 There are two moments in the first Critique where Kant tries to address this issue—in the Schematism and the Appendix of the Transcendental Dialectic—but his reflections in the two introductions of the third Critique suggest that his attempted solutions from the first Critique do not entirely suffice.
In connection with the issue of a more expansive approach to judgment, the third puzzle is that the apperception view of intelligibility emphasized throughout by Pippin does not entirely fit with the account of judgment presented in Hegel’s texts, especially in key moments of the Doctrine of the Concept. Hegel consistently affirms the Hölderlinian idea of judgment as Ur-Teilung or ursprüngliche Teilung, an original, primordial, and primitive division of an original oneness and unity. Hegel writes: “Judgment is the self-diremption of the Concept. . . . the original division of original unity; the word Urteil thus refers to what judgment is in and for itself” (WL 522/6:304). Although the interpretive issues surrounding this idea are, again, very complex, the idea of judgment as original division is clearly tied to the activity of negation and negativity (Negativität, Entzweiung) more broadly understood, which play a large role in Hegel’s philosophy. Here I simply want to note that although apperception and self-consciousness are undeniably important for Hegel’s elaboration of these themes, the idea of judgment as original division and negativity extends more widely than Pippin suggests, and Hegel often discusses such activity as unconscious, immediate, and manifest in living beings as part of their life-activity. Two moments from the Doctrine of the Concept are particularly important. In the opening section, “On the Concept in General,” Hegel writes:

Life, or organic nature, is the stage of nature at which the Concept comes on the scene, but as blind, as unaware of itself and unthinking; the Concept that is self-conscious and thinks pertains solely to spirit. (WL 517/6:257)

And in the chapter on “Life” in the concluding section on the “Idea,” Hegel discusses the activity of life in terms of Hölderlin’s definition of judgment:

The original judgment of life [Das ursprüngliche Urteil des Lebens] consists therefore in this, that it separates itself off as individual subject from the objective, and in constituting itself as the negative unity of the Concept, makes the presupposition of an immediate objectivity. (WL 678/6:473)

However one comes to interpret these undeniably puzzling passages from key moments of the Begriffslogik, it is clear that on Hegel’s understanding, Concept and judgment are deeply connected to organic form and the activity of living beings. Pippin’s strong association of Concept and judgment as such with apperception (“the basic feature [of judgment]: judging is apperceptive. This is a logical (or formal) truth . . . because all judging is apperceptive, conscious of judging in judging” [103]) thus appears to be at odds with Hegel’s official account, in which apperception and self-consciousness are realizations of a broader form of activity that includes non-self-conscious life. Again, I want to suggest that third Critique themes loom large here: taking his cue from Kant that the first Critique account of apperceptive judgment is incomplete, Hegel takes seriously a central claim from the third Critique that “purposiveness defines the

14 Pippin discusses negation and negativity extensively in chapter 4, and original division on 144.
15 Pippin claims that even Kant’s formulation that the “I think” must “accompany” all my representations is misleading, since it undercuts the idea that judging as such is apperceptive, possibly implying that consciousness of judging can occur as a second step or second act (103; see also 105).
‘space of judgment’,” 16 empowering its activity to ensure that its acts of determination are not “arbitrary and blind,” but instead grasps the substantial form or Concept actualized in things themselves (EE 20:211). Importantly, Hegel interprets purposiveness primarily in terms of internal purposiveness, as the distinctive unity of organic activity and form, which he calls “Kant’s great service to philosophy” insofar as it opens up “the concept of life” and the “Idea” (WL 654/6:440). As the conclusion of the Doctrine of the Concept and the Logic as a whole, the Idea represents the completion of Hegel’s account of the possibility and fundamental principles of intelligibility, and the progression of the Logic leaves little doubt as to the significance of purposiveness and life for that account. In my final section, I argue that the continued emphasis on apperception obscures a fundamental insight of Hegel’s logic project, namely, the role of life as an a priori principle of intelligibility.

3. Hegel’s Critique of Judgment: Life as the Immediate Idea

As I noted, Pippin indeed heads increasingly in the direction of considering the influence of Kant’s third Critique, with the two penultimate chapters of his book, and a good part of the final chapter, discussing the significance of purposiveness and life for Hegel’s Logic and the Doctrine of the Concept in particular. Two issues are highlighted to orient his discussion (253). First, Pippin raises the question of why the concept of life is included as part of a science of logic at all. The existence of life is surely a contingent empirical fact, and any distinctive features of life that we might discover are likewise empirical matters. Since it is clear that any such empirical questions concerning life cannot belong to an a priori investigation, the issue becomes what Hegel could mean in treating life as a distinctly logical concept, and its significance for the question of the possibility of intelligibility as such. Second, Pippin raises the question of how we are to understand Hegel’s persistent metaphor that thinking, concepts, and speculative logic itself is “alive,” contrasting his own “living” logic with the “dead bones” of what he takes to be the empty formalism of rival accounts. These two questions are clearly related, and indicate the reflexivity of Hegel’s account: if thinking or conceptual activity is essentially living activity, then the concept of life must figure necessarily, a priori, as a part of thinking’s self-awareness in giving an account of itself, and of the necessary thought-determinations without which intelligibility would not be possible. The claim contained in the antecedent, that conceptual thought (das begreifende Denken) is essentially living activity, that whatever else thinking is, it is, in its essential form (or as Idea), an actualization of the form of activity of life—this claim is, I argue, the key innovation of Hegel’s approach to the problem of intelligibility in the Logic, an innovation whose predecessor is clearly Kant’s third rather than first Critique.

Pippin’s own answers to these two questions are instructive, but the emphasis on apperception sometimes obscures Hegel’s thesis regarding life as the immediate Idea. Regarding the second question, Pippin argues that we can interpret the aliveness of logic as an expression of the purposiveness of reason (reason’s conatus or reason’s need).17 The purposive

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16 Allison 2001, 40.
17 Pippin takes up this question in chapter 7.
or teleological shape of reason’s activity—that it pursues ends, and even a final end—is interpreted primarily in terms of practical reason and practical contradictions, generally in the service of a theory of freedom. Although I agree with the broad strokes of his account, interpreting the aliveness of concepts primarily in terms of the self-constituting, self-conscious, and purposive character of practical reason renders Hegel’s talk of life as almost entirely metaphorical, whereas the Logic presents the problem life in literal, organic terms. Reason is not like life because it pursues ends, reason is life and life-activity — with a corporeal shape, parts that belong to a whole, pains, assimilation processes, and reproduces itself in accordance with its species.\(^{18}\)

Regarding the first question (what it is for life to be a logical and not empirical concept), Pippin argues that the distinction between mechanism and teleology, along with the concept of life, are to be understood as a priori insofar as “objects and events would not be available to us in their full intelligibility if the distinction between living and nonliving could not be made” (275). In investigating the possibility of intelligibility as such, what we discover is a realm of being that would remain unintelligible and inexplicable without the a priori distinction between mechanism and teleology, which in turn reveals that the intelligibility of living, purposive activity requires a distinctive logical form. This is surely an important dimension of Hegel’s argument, but it tends toward treating life as a thought-determination on par with the other thought-determinations in the Logic (the intelligibility of being requires the categories of quality, quantity, identity, mechanism, etc. and also life).\(^{20}\) However, the Idea for Hegel is not just one among a set of thought-determinations; rather, the Idea for Hegel is the very intelligibility of intelligibility, or the form of all intelligibility as such (as he says: the unity of Concept and objectivity, or Concept and reality). That Hegel names life as the immediate form of intelligibility means that acts of rendering intelligible are as such opened up by life, or again, that the very question of rendering being intelligible is immediately opened up by the form of activity of life. This is Hegel’s version of Kant’s claim that purposiveness opens up the space of judgment, and it is still an a priori claim: life is a necessary condition for the intelligibility of intelligibility, and living beings are the only beings for whom beings can be intelligible. If life is the immediate form of intelligibility as such, self-consciousness is life coming to awareness of itself and its forms of rendering intelligible, an actualization and development of a more primitive, immediate, and unconscious form of activity. Both in the Logic and throughout his writings, Hegel associates this self-consciousness with consciousness of life, with species-awareness always being the key for his presentation of this development. At the very least, the determination of life as the immediate Idea poses a serious challenge for Pippin’s claim that intelligibility as such is self-conscious intelligibility.\(^{21}\)

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19 Pippin takes up this question in chapter 8.
20 Although he expresses reservations about his own formulation here, Pippin presents a version of this thought at 282.
21 Pippin comes close to articulating the more ambitious claim regarding life as a principle of intelligibility (and not just a necessary thought-determination if certain kinds of beings and events are to be rendered intelligible) at 254-255, 283, and 302, but these claims are generally overshadowed by the apperception claim.
If I read him correctly, Pippin would likely have two concerns regarding the claim that life is an a priori principle of intelligibility: first, that it renders intelligibility species-specific and indexes intelligibility to the specific capacities of particular life-forms; and second, that it undermines the notions of self-determination and responsibility that undergird the notion of rational judgment. In responding to the first, I would say that although species-specificity surely matters for determining specific capacities for cognition (a question that does not belong to logic), Hegel’s claim that life is the immediate Idea does not index intelligibility as such to species-specific capacities, but only to a very general, a priori form of activity that he would argue is common to all life, and is presupposed by the very idea of activity as such. The controversial claims here are that there is such a general form of activity (and that he has correctly identified it), and further, that mindedness as such is a matter of living activity (intelligibility is the question of how being is rendered intelligible by living activity, and the self-consciousness of that activity). The second concern is more complicated and I can only gesture at a cursory response here: organic, teleological activity exhibits the basic form of self-determination as such, and however we come to understand self-conscious self-determination, it cannot be fully separated from our understanding of that more basic form. Taking us far beyond the confines of the present discussion, the notion of responsibility and its central role in our understanding of the space of reasons might also need to be rethought. Most generally, and as I have been urging, the notion of judgment would need to be expanded, extending beyond the most explicit acts of rendering intelligible expressed by a particular understanding of self-conscious, rational beings.

*Hegel’s Realm of Shadows* is a tremendous achievement, and there is no question as to why Pippin’s work on Hegel and German idealism has transformed an entire subdiscipline. It should not be missed by anyone interested in Hegel and nineteenth-century philosophy more broadly, and will surely shape discussions of the *Science of Logic* for years to come.

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22 The most comprehensive treatment of the relation between the form of freedom and the form of life in Hegel is Khurana 2017.
Science of Logic, for in it Hegel has made it quite clear why he begins with pure being. It may safely be said that the main obstacle to a grasp of the Logic is the fact that we are unaccustomed to dialectical thinking. Hegel's science of logic, and are loth to make the effort to rid ourselves of the prejudices and presuppositions on which our ordinary thinking rests. We have always to be on our guard that we do not allow ourselves to rely solely upon the understanding, the abstractive intellect, which holds its concepts rigidly apart in isolation and overlooks their essential connectedness. The judgment of reflection is what Hegel refers to when he deals with the different quantifiers possible in the relation of the subject and the predicate in judgments. It is on the basis of Hegel's metaphysical commitments that his discussion of quantity in judgment can be distinguished most clearly from Immanuel Kant's. I will argue that these commitments are manifest in the assumptions, method, and standpoint in accordance with which Hegel's Science of Logic unfolds. Discover the world's research. 19+ million members. Reconsidering Hegel's logic. Jim Kreines. 'Spinoza and Kant at the Transition to the Begriffslogik: Arguing for and against Systems of Philosophy'. Karen Ng. Robert Pippin. The question at issue is the status of the difference between living and nonliving beings, an issue that gained in importance in the late eighteenth century when Kant, in his Critique of Judgment (1790), in effect admitted that his earlier critical philosophy had not grounded such a distinction as a pure or categorical distinction, knowable as such a priori, and that this omission was unacceptable. But for Hegel, in his Science of Logic (1812-1816), Kant's attempt to argue for some sort of objective status to the distinction, and so to teleological judgments, failed.